



# Finding and Management of Abnormal Radioactive Material in Taiwan


Ju-chuan Huang  
Department of Radiation Protection, AEC  
July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014

# Establishing radiation detection system at steel mills


- 0 In 1992, some apartments built during 1982-84 were first discovered containing  $^{60}\text{Co}$ -contaminated steel rebar.
- 0 For the purpose of preventing from mis-smelting of radioactive sources into steel-making processing, 19 iron and steel makers who own furnace(s) are required to install portal type radiation detectors(s) since 1995, to intercept radioactive sources contained in scrap metal and stop its entry into the steel mill.
- 0 In case of imported scrap metal being detected containing radioactive sources, the scrap metal will be shipped back to its original export country.



## Number of Radiation Events Occurred Upon Finding Abnormal Radioactive Material at Domestic Steel Mills



## Classification of Abnormal Radioactive Material





# Contaminated steel rebar found at a steel mill



# NORM contamination on the surface of scrap metal





# Bare Cs-137 source found



# Cs-137 source with shielding





# Other examples found very often at steel mills

Gauges containing Ra-226



scale contaminated by NORM



# Guideline for managing abnormal radioactive material found

## I. INTERCEPTING

Steel mills or recycling industries find abnormal radioactive material by radiation detection

## II. NOTIFYING

Notify AEC by faxing or emailing an abnormal event notification form

## III. RECEIVING

INER receives the found material

## IX. ANALYZING

A radionuclide analysis report by INER

## X. INVESTIGATION

AEC implement comprehensive radiation detection, event investigation and material receiving

## XI. SHIPPING BACK OR STORED

In case the material are supplied by a foreign supplier, shipping back to its original export country is the priority of choice; otherwise it would be stored in INER

# Case – Tung Ho Steel Enterprise Corporation

## Follow the Guideline to manage what found that radioactive

### 0 ***Intercepting:***

1. A truck with imported scrap metal was detected radioactive by portal type radiation detectors when entering the site.
2. A site guide directed the truck to stop at a temporary area to unload the scrap metal, and put radiation signs and made controls for keeping personnel away from there.
3. A piece of object was found 2 hours later by a qualified staff with a handy NaI detector.
4. 13 uSv/hr was detected at the object surface, then it was stored temporarily on the on-site radiation storage room.

### 0 ***Notification:*** Tung Ho notified AEC by an email with description of finding history, detection results and photos.

### 0 ***Receiving and analyzing:*** INER took it back for detailed analysis, and found that it be a Cs-137 orphan source.

### 0 ***Investigation:*** Comprehensive detection and event investigation were implemented by AEC

### 0 ***Shipping back:*** due to an orphan source being found, AEC requested Tung Ho to ship the source back to its original country or supplier



# Analysis Report For The Found Object

item	test results			organization
object type	Source			Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER)
radiation dose rate ( $\mu\text{Sv/h}$ )	surface	at 30 cm	at 100 cm	
	35	2.6	0.5	
nuclide	Cs-137			
activity	100mCi on the sign			
size	45cm $\times$ 45cm			
shape	Cylinder			
weight	57.63 kg			



SIMS GROUP GLOBAL TRADE CORPORATION  
110 Fifth Avenue, Suite 700  
New York, NY 10011-5614 USA  
Phone 212-604-0710  
Facsimile 212-604-0710  
www.simgroup.com

TO: Atomic Energy Council  
80, Section 1, Chenggong Road,  
Yonghe City, Taipei County 23452,  
Taiwan

Date: March 19, 2010

### AGREEMENT

We, SA Recycling, LLC, on behalf of Sims Group Global Trade Corporation, hereby agree to accept the return of the item containing radioactive material which was found at Miaoli Works of Tung Ho Steel Enterprise Corporation on October 27, 09'. We agree to import this subject material from Taoyuan, Taiwan to Atlanta, USA where it can be properly managed pursuant to all State and Federal laws. It is our understanding that the unit shielded and does not pose a threat to the public while in transport.

Disposing details as follows:

Description of subject radioactive material: Cesium 137 (Berthold Brand)  
Weight: about 25kg / Length: about 45cm / Width: about 45cm  
Place of export: Taoyuan Airport, Taiwan  
Place of import: Atlanta Airport, USA  
Place of disposal: Knoxville, Tennessee, USA  
Disposed company: TOXCO Material Management Center  
Discovered in Taiwan Container No. TRLU8115580  
Date Material was delivered from USA: 9/18/09

Lindsay Maine 3/19/10  
Lindsay Maine, Environmental Manager

- Prior to exporting the item containing radioactive material, it is necessary to get an agreement letter that guaranties to properly receive it, for ensuring that it wouldn't become an orphan source internationally.



482 Pier T Avenue - Berth 118  
Long Beach, California 90802  
Phone 562-628-8100  
www.sarecycling.com

June 15<sup>th</sup> 2010

To whom it may concern:

This letter states that SA Recycling, LLC has received the following material on 4/17/2010 at Atlanta Airport

Description of material: Cesium 137 (Berthold Brand)

Weight: about 25kgs/ Length: About 45cm/ Width: about 45cm

Place of Export: Taoyuan Airport, Taiwan

Disposal Company: Toxco Material Management Center

Discovered in Taiwan Container No.: TRLU8115580

The material is currently at TOXCO Material for disposal.

If you have any questions or concern, please feel free to contact me.

  
Silvana Jones  
Logistics Manager  
SA Recycling, LLC

- Usually we would get an inform letter from the receiver, saying that what the current status of the item containing radioactive material is. (ex. has been received and disposed in this case)



# The Megaports Initiative



Radiation portal monitor  
as primary inspection

- 0 Initiated by the US DOE.
- 0 Any containers to be imported into the USA territory should be detected when transporting through the radiation portal monitors before leaving export ports.
- 0 This is originally purposed on threaten deterring, anti-smuggling or anti-proliferation of radioactive material.



RIID



Ortec Detective

Personal radiation detector  
as secondary inspection

# Detection mechanism at Megaports



primary  
inspection



Central alarm station



Secondary  
inspection



# Current Status of Implementation

- 0 In 2006, the USDOE equipped some radiation portal monitors and handy portable radiation detectors at the container terminals of the Port of Kaohsiung. Now they are the duty of Kaohsiung Customs.
- 0 Besides antiterrorism task, Kaohsiung Customs uses the equipment to **detect containers which are imported, exported or in transit.**
- 0 Ex. in response to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, there have been some Japan-exported containers found slightly radio-contaminated.
- 0 Therefore, it can be somewhat regarded as **a subsidiary mechanism** for intercepting items containing radioactive material into our land, **helping for achieving that goal of well managing abnormal radioactive material in Taiwan.**





**WOW TAIWAN** 台灣  
TAIWANderful

**Thanks for attention!!**