一、NEI 06-12提出「The site should have an engineering basis that provides reasonable assurance that the intended makeup rate and capacities can be provided」，惟部分採用現有設備(如AP-P100/AP-P101等項)或一些移動式配置(如以消防車作RWST、CST補水等項)，此類設備未備妥工程基礎之文件，與NEI 12-06導則不符合。核三廠應針對B.5.b策略所有設備列表，逐項清查確認工程基礎評估文件之完整性，針對未完備之設備建立並納入工程基礎評估之文件，以佐證其能力符合NEI導則要求。
三、NEI 06-12提出「Generally describe the capabilities available to isolate the site fire header from major structures in the event damage to the structure compromises the integrity of the fire protections system. For example, describe how the fire header feeding the structure containing the SFP can be isolated. If the site fire header is intended to be used for reactor mitigation strategies, the capability to isolate other structures may also need to be described (e,g., Auxiliary Buildings, Reactor Buildings, Control Buildings, etc.)」，核三廠目前並無符合相關敘述之因應措施。核三廠應建立符合NEI 06-12 Table A.2-6程序書/指引，以適切處理消防系統資源在共用及平衡的考量。
四、承上項， NEI 12-06「Potential detrimental impact on water supply source or output pressure when using the same source or permanently installed pump(s) for both makeup and firefighting.」，核三廠目前並無符合相關敘述之因應措施。核三廠應事先分析評估可能共用之水源減損或壓力不足，以適切處理水源在消防及補水兩者共用及平衡的考量。
五、就設備儲存(儲備)場所而言，B.5.b策略之儲存原則為「more than approximately 100 yards from the target area」，FLEX策略須考量各種可能的自然危害之防護能力，兩者顯有不同。核三廠列在191程序書之設備，目前或有設備並非完全相符、或有混淆。核三廠須建立設備列表，加以釐清並確認避免混淆。
八、NEI 06-12提出「Level of training on implementing procedures/guidance is expected to be consistent with SAMG-type actions and consistent with utility commitments made under B.5.b Phase 1.」，考量B.5.b策略要求(NEI 06-12導則)，核三廠應再強化相關訓練、演練之完整性、涵蓋性，以符合NEI 06-12導則之要求。
